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Abstract
& Young and older adults are more likely to remember emo-
tional information than neutral information. The present func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural
processes supporting young (ages 18–35) and older (ages
62–79) adults’ successful encoding of positive, negative, and
neutral objects (e.g., a sundae, a grenade, a canoe). The re-
sults revealed general preservation of the emotional memory
network across the age groups. Both groups recruited the
amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex during the successful
encoding of positive and negative information. Both ages also
showed valence-specific recruitment: right fusiform activity
was greatest during the successful encoding of negative in-
formation, whereas left prefrontal and temporal activity was
greatest during the successful encoding of positive informa-
tion. These valence-specific processes are consistent with be-
havioral evidence that negative information is processed with
perceptual detail, whereas positive information is processed
at a conceptual or schematic level. The only age differences
in emotional memory emerged during the successful encod-
ing of positive items: Older adults showed more activity in
the medial prefrontal cortex and along the cingulate gyrus
than young adults. Because these regions often are associated
with self-referential processing, these results suggest that older
adults’ mnemonic boost for positive information may stem
from an increased tendency to process this information in
relation to themselves. &
INTRODUCTION
Individuals typically are more likely to remember emo-
tional information than they are to remember nonemo-
tional information (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Reisberg &
Heuer, 2004; Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002). Although the
neural processes corresponding to this emotional mem-
ory enhancement have been thoroughly studied in
young adults, with activation in the amygdala and the
orbito-frontal cortex corresponding with later memory
for emotional material (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Hamann,
2001), little is known about how the emotional memory
network changes with age. The primary goal of the pres-
ent study was to examine the neural processes that cor-
respond with young and older adults’ successful encoding
of emotional information.
On the one hand, there is reason to believe that the
emotional memory network may be fairly stable with
aging. Some behavioral studies have suggested that
older adults display emotional memory enhancements
comparable to those of young adults (e.g., Denburg,
Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003; Kensinger, Brierley,
Medford, Growdon, & Corkin, 2002). Moreover, the
regions associated with emotional memory in young
adults (e.g., amygdala and orbito-frontal cortex) tend
to be relatively preserved with aging, both structurally
(Salat et al., 2004; Salat, Kaye, & Janowsky, 2001; Chow
& Cummings, 2000; Tisserand, Visser, van Boxtel, &
Jolles, 2000) and functionally (Gutchess, Kensinger, &
Schacter, 2007; Williams et al., 2006). On the other hand,
however, are studies that have suggested that the va-
lence of information (whether positive or negative) may
fundamentally influence the way in which older adults
process and remember emotional information. A num-
ber of studies have revealed a ‘‘positivity shift’’ with
aging; whereas young adults are more likely to remem-
ber negative information than positive or neutral infor-
mation, older adults may be at least as likely (or even
more likely) to remember positive information com-
pared with negative information (Mather & Carstensen,
2005).
It has been proposed that this ‘‘positivity shift’’ may
occur because older adults put more emphasis on emo-
tion regulation goals than do young adults, with older
adults having a greater motivation to derive emotional
meaning from life and to maintain positive affect (e.g.,
Mather & Carstensen, 2005). In the service of these
goals, older adults may focus their attention on things
that will elicit pleasant feelings (Mather, 2006; Carstensen,
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) and may process positive
information in a more self-referential fashion (Gutchess
et al., 2007). Although this argument has some empirical
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clusion that older adults’ ‘‘positivity shift’’ results from
changes in encoding processes. For example, when per-
forming a digit parity task in which positive or negative
distractor words were presented in between the two
numbers that were to be evaluated, older adults did not
show a disproportionate interference effect from the
positive words compared to the negative words. Never-
theless, the older adults did later remember the positive
words better than the negative words (Thomas & Hasher,
2006). These findings suggest that older adults’ positivity
bias may not arise from increased attention toward
positive items at the time of encoding. However, when
older adults’ attentional resources are taxed during en-
coding (by use of a divided attention manipulation), their
positivity effect disappears (Mather & Knight, 2005),
suggesting that there may be a link between the way in
which older adults process positive versus negative at
encoding that leads to their mnemonic benefit for posi-
tive information.
The present functional magnetic resonance imaging
study used a subsequent-memory paradigm, in which
encoding-related activity to items of different valences
was analyzed as a function of whether the items were
later remembered or forgotten (for more information on
the use of the subsequent-memory paradigm, see review
by Paller & Wagner, 2002). Thus, the present study could
examine whether there are age-related changes in the
neural processes supporting the successful encoding of
emotional information, and whether such changes could
explain older adults’ positivity shift. If age-related
changes in encoding processes correspond with the
positivity shift, then it should be possible to demon-
strate age-related changes in the neural processes that
predict subsequent memory for positive information.
We therefore compared the neural processes that young
and older adults recruited as they encoded positive,
negative, and neutral information. This design allowed
us to examine subsequent-memory effects that general-
ize to all emotional items (i.e., positive and negative ones)
and also to uncover subsequent-memory effects that are
valence-specific (i.e., that correspond with memory for
positive but not negative items, or vice-versa).
T oa c c o m p l i s ht h e s eg o a l s ,w eu s e dap a r a d i g m
previously shown to lead to an emotional memory en-
hancement only for negative information in young
adults but to lead to a broader emotional memory en-
hancement for negative and positive information in
older adults (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007a,
2007b). In this paradigm, young and older adults are
shown objects, some with negative content (e.g., a snake),
some with positive content (e.g., a sundae), and others
with neutral content (e.g., a canoe). After a delay, par-
ticipants are shown another series of objects and are
asked to discriminate items that are the ‘‘same’’ (identical
to studied objects) from objects that are ‘‘similar’’ (share
the same verbal label as a studied object, but differ in
visual details) or from objects that are ‘‘new’’ (unrelated
to a studied object). The ‘‘positivity shift’’ is manifest in
the fact that young adults perform well when judging
whether negative objects are ‘‘new,’’ but perform equally
poorly when judging whether neutral or positive objects
are ‘‘new.’’ By contrast, older adults are equally good
at knowing whether negative or positive objects are
‘‘new.’’
An important feature of this paradigm is that it can
distinguish memory for an object’s visual details (i.e., a
participants’ ability to know that something is ‘‘same’’
rather than ‘‘similar’’) from memory for an object’s gist
or general theme (i.e., a participants’ ability to know that
something is not ‘‘new’’). This distinction is an impor-
tant one to make because previous behavioral research
has demonstrated that negative items are more likely to
be remembered with visual detail than neutral or posi-
tive items (Kensinger, 2007). Importantly, this valence-
specific boost for visual details occurs for both young
and older adults. Older adults, just like young adults,
remember the visual details of negative objects more
frequently than they remember the visual details of pos-
itive or neutral objects, and they show no boost in mem-
ory for the visual details of positive items as compared to
neutral ones (e.g., Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter,
2007c; Kensinger, O’Brien, Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, &
Schacter, 2007; Kensinger et al., 2007a, 2007b). This
preservation sets up an interesting contrast regarding
older adults’ emotional memories: Although older
adults show a benefit for remembering the general
theme of positive information, they show no benefit
for remembering the specific visual details of positive
items and, in fact, are better at remembering negative
items’ visual details.
These findings suggest that there is something dif-
ferent about the way in which positive and negative
information is processed, such that across the adult
lifespan, negative information is remembered with
more detail than positive information. Positive informa-
tion may be processed in a gist-like or heuristic fashion,
with attention drawn to the general features of the
presented information but not the exact details. By
contrast, negative information may be processed in a
more detail-oriented and analytic fashion, with attention
focused on the item details (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 2002;
Bless et al., 1996). Although behavioral evidence sup-
ports such a distinction (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter,
2006; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Levine & Bluck, 2004;
Ochsner, 2000), it is not known how the neural circuitry
recruited during the processing of positive and negative
information leads to these different effects on mem-
ory. Nor is it understood why aging changes the propor-
tion of positive information remembered (i.e., results in
a ‘‘positivity shift’’) but not the visual details remem-
bered about positive items. The present study explored
these open questions regarding the emotional memory
network.
1162 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 7METHODS
Participants
Seventeen young adults (5 men and 12 women; ages
19–31 years; mean age = 21.6 years) and 20 older adults
(7 men and 13 women; ages 62–79 years; mean age =
73.3 years) participated in this study. The data from
t h r e eo l d e ra d u l t s( 1m a na n d2w o m e n )w e r ee x -
cluded due to difficulty following task instructions
(one participant) or chance performance on the sub-
sequent memory task (two participants). All partici-
pants were native English speakers who had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and all were screened
to exclude those with any contraindicators for mag-
netic resonance imaging scanning or with any history
of neurological trauma or psychiatric disorder (e.g., de-
pression or anxiety disorder). No participant reported
that they were currently taking any medications that
affected the central nervous system. Informed con-
sent was obtained from all participants in a method
approved by the Harvard University, Boston College,
and Massachusetts General Hospital Institutional Review
Boards.
Older adults had an average of 17.5 years of educa-
tion, consistent with the level of education completed
(or expected to be completed) by the young adults
(young adults had an average of 15.2 years of education,
and all were either enrolled in a bachelor’s program or
had already received their bachelor’s degree). Older
adults performed as well as young adults on the for-
ward and backward digit span, significantly better than
young adults on the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997) vocabu-
lary subtest, and significantly worse than young adults
on the WAIS-III digit/symbol copy subtest (see Table 1
for test scores). This pattern of performance is con-
sistent with that typically associated with healthy aging
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2003), and there were no differ-
ences in the age-adjusted scores on the WAIS-III sub-
tests, suggesting that the two age groups were generally
well-matched. All older adults achieved scores of 28 or
higher on the Mini-Mental Status Examination (Folstein,
Folstein, & McHugh, 1975).
Materials and Procedure
Materials comprised 435 pairs of colored, nameable photo
objects (Hemera Technologies, 2002, Canada), sized to
300 pixels in their largest dimension. Pairs of objects were
selected so that the two items of a pair shared the same
verbal label (e.g., were both umbrellas) but differed in
other perceptual features (e.g., color, shape, size, orien-
tation). Object pairs were selected from those used by
Kensinger et al. (2007a, 2007b) and Kensinger, Garoff-
Eaton, and Schacter (2006); as described in those papers,
young and older adults rated objects on 9-point Likert
scales for valence (with low numbers signifying negative
objects and high numbers signifying positive objects) and
arousal (with high numbers indicating high arousal). We
selected 145 object pairs that had been judged by young
and older adults to be negative and arousing (valence
ratings of less than 3.5 and arousal ratings of greater than
5), 145 object pairs that had been rated as positive and
arousing (valence ratings greater than 5.5 and arousal
ratings greater than 5), and 145 object pairs that had been
determined to be neutral and nonarousing (valence rang-
ing between 3 and 6 and arousal less than 5). Pairs also
were selected to assure that the negative and positive
objects had similar arousal levels and similar absolute va-
lence levels (i.e., distances from neutral valence) to one
another (all p > .15), and so that the positive and negative
items differed significantly from the neutral items in both
valence and arousal ( p < .001). Pairs also were selected
so that there were no age differences in the ratings of
objects based upon their valence and arousal (all p >. 1 5 ) .
Furthermore, positive, negative, and neutral item pairs
were matched to one another with regard to the overall
similarity of the two items, the dimensions (color, size,
shape, orientation) that differed between the two items,
and the familiarity of the items (as determined by famil-
iarity values for the verbal referents of the objects).
Study Procedure
While in the functional magnetic resonance imaging scan-
ner, participants were presented with 324 nameable,
Table 1. Mean (SE) Test Scores for Participants
WAIS-III Digit/Symbol WAIS-III Vocabulary
Digit Span











Young adults N/A 6.94 (0.43) 5.12 (0.27) 71.3 (3.2) 9.8 (0.53) 81.7 (2.2) 16.1 (0.33)
Older adults 29.6 (0.08) 6.18 (0.27) 4.82 (0.36) 48.8 (2.3) 10.1 (0.46) 88.9 (1.9) 16.5 (0.47)
MMSE = Mini-Mental Status Examination (Folstein et al., 1975); WAIS-III = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd Edition (Wechsler, 1997).
Older adults completed significantly fewer entries on the digit/symbol copy than young adults, and older adults correctly defined more words on
the Vocabulary assessment than young adults; however, the age groups did not differ from one another in their age-adjusted scaled scores on either
of these tasks.
aMeasure on which there was a significant age difference ( p < .05).
Kensinger and Schacter 1163colored objects. These objects were presented across
three lists, with each list containing 108 items (36 nega-
tive, 36 positive, 36 neutral). Each item was presented
for 1 sec. Participants made a size decision about whether
each object, in the real world, would fit inside of a filing
cabinet drawer. Participants were asked to make this
decision as quickly as possible. Emotion of the item did
not affect participants’ reaction times to make the deci-
sions about the objects. Following the item’s presenta-
tion, a fixation cross (+) was presented for a variable
duration (range of 5–13 sec) to provide jitter (Dale, 1999).
Test Procedure
Outside of the scanner, after approximately a 30-min
delay, participants performed a surprise object recogni-
tion task. On the recognition task, participants were
presented with 432 objects: 216 objects (72 negative, 72
positive, 72 neutral) were identical to those that had
been studied (same objects); 108 objects (36 negative,
36 positive, 36 neutral) shared the same verbal label as a
studied item but differed in color, size, shape, or orien-
tation (similar objects); and 108 were new objects (36
negative, 36 positive, 36 neutral; Figure 1). Each object
appeared in the center of a computer screen, with a
prompt below indicating that participants should indi-
cate, by keypress, whether the item was same, similar,
or new. The member of the object pair that was
included on the recognition task was held constant for
all participants; the particular items presented at study
were counterbalanced between participants to manipu-
late the condition of each object shown at recognition.
The neuroimaging analyses focus on participants’
encoding of items later tested with the same exemplar.
1
If a participant gave a ‘‘same’’ response to a same item,
this signifies memory for the visual details of that item
(‘‘specific recognition’’); a ‘‘similar’’ response indicates
memory for the general type of item but not for its exact
visual details (‘‘nonspecific recognition’’); and a ‘‘new’’
response reflects complete forgetting of the item’s pre-
sentation. Taken together, a ‘‘same’’ or a ‘‘similar’’ re-
sponse to a same item indicates memory for at least the
general features of an item (referred to throughout as
‘‘general recognition’’).
Image Acquisition and Data Analysis
Images were acquired on a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra MRI
scanner. Detailed anatomic data were acquired using a
multiplanar rapidly acquired gradient-echo (MP-RAGE)
sequence. Functional images were acquired using a T2*-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR =
3000 msec, TE = 30 msec, FOV = 200 mm; flip angle =
908). Twenty-eight axial–oblique slices (3.2 mm thick-
ness, 0.6 mm skip between slices), aligned along the an-
terior commissure/posterior commissure line, were
acquired in an interleaved fashion.
All preprocessing and data analysis were conducted
within SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neu-
rology). Standard preprocessing was performed on the
functional data, including slice-timing correction, rigid-
body motion correction, normalization to the Montreal
Neurological Institute template (resampling at 3 mm
3
voxels), and spatial smoothing (using a 7.6-mm full-
width half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel).
For each participant, and on a voxel-by-voxel basis,
an event-related analysis was first conducted in which
all instances of a particular event type were modeled
through convolution with a canonical hemodynamic re-
sponse function. Analyses focused on subsequent mem-
ory for items tested as the same exemplar on the
recognition task, and all participants had at least 15 in-
stances of ‘‘same,’’ ‘‘similar,’’ and ‘‘new’’ responses to
the same items from each emotion category. Effects for
each event type were estimated using a subject-specific
fixed-effects model. These data were then entered into
a second-order random-effects analysis.
Random-effects analyses contrasted activation as a
function of subsequent memory performance separately
for each emotion type (negative, positive, or neutral),
and interaction analyses revealed the regions that relat-
ed more strongly to subsequent memory performance
for one emotion type than for another. Conjunction
analyses (using the masking function in SPM) were used
to examine the regions that showed activation in a par-
ticular contrast (or interaction analysis) in both young
and older adults, and group comparisons were con-
ducted to reveal what regions showed a greater corre-
spondence to subsequent memory performance in one
Figure 1. Task design. At encoding, participants viewed a series of
photo objects and judged whether each would fit inside a file cabinet
drawer. During retrieval, participants determined whether each
object was the ‘‘same’’ (identical) as a studied object, was ‘‘similar’’
(shared the same verbal label, but differed in visual detail), or was
‘‘new’’ (different verbal label than any studied item).
1164 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 7age group than in the other. Contrasts entered into the
conjunction analyses were analyzed with a p < .01 and
5-voxel extent threshold. Thus, the conjoint probability
of the conjunction analysis was p < .001, uncorrected
(Lazar, Luna, Sweeney, & Eddy, 2002; Fisher, 1950).
Group comparison analyses were conducted with a
p < .001 and 5-voxel extent threshold. All activations
are presented in neurological coordinates (i.e., activity
on the right hemisphere is presented on the right side
of the brain images). Voxel coordinates are reported in
Talairach and Tournoux (1988) coordinates and identify
the peak voxel within the cluster of activation.
Event-related time courses were extracted from active
clusters by creating regions of interest (ROIs), includ-
ing all significant voxels within a 5-mm radius of each
chosen maximum voxel, using the ROI toolbox imple-
mented in MarsBar (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline,
2002). Within each of these ROIs, a hemodynamic
response function was calculated for each individual
subject and for each condition type (relative to fixation
baseline) as a function of peristimulus time (0–21 sec).
Statistics were performed on the sum of the signal
change within a peristimulus time of 3–12 sec. These
signal change values are displayed in the figures. Analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was performed on these extracted
signal change values to examine whether the ROIs
showed an interaction between memory accuracy and
emotion type (e.g., activity relating to memory for the
visual details of an negative item but not for visual details
of a neutral or positive item), between memory accuracy
and age (e.g., activity relating more strongly to memory
for visual details for young adults than for older adults,
or vice versa), or a three-way interaction among memory
accuracy, detail type, and age.
RESULTS
Behavioral and neuroimaging data were analyzed with
participants’ sex as a factor. No main effects of sex or
interactions between age and sex were revealed. There-
fore, all reported analyses collapse together data from
men and women. As in previous studies using variants of
this paradigm (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, et al., 2007c;
Kensinger, O’Brien, et al., 2007; Kensinger et al., 2006;
Garoff, Slotnick, & Schacter, 2005), we focus on subse-
quent memory effects for items later tested as a same
exemplar (but see Table 2 for distribution of responses
to all tested items). We considered ‘‘same’’ responses to
same studied items to reflect memory for specific visual
details (‘‘specific recognition’’) and ‘‘similar’’ responses
to same studied items to indicate memory for some (but
not all) aspects of the studied item (‘‘nonspecific recog-
nition’’). Collectively, we considered ‘‘same’’ or ‘‘simi-
lar’’ responses to same studied items to indicate memory
for at least the general theme of the studied item
(‘‘general recognition’’).
Behavioral Results
An ANOVA conducted on the general recognition scores
revealed an interaction between age and valence ( p <
.01): Whereas young adults showed better general rec-
ognition for negative items than for positive or neutral
ones (i.e., negative > positive = neutral), older adults
showed equally good general recognition for negative
and positive items (i.e., negative = positive > neutral;
see Table 2). This pattern of results is consistent with
the ‘‘positivity shift’’ that has been reported in a number
of prior studies (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Although
the strongest instantiation of the ‘‘positivity shift’’ oc-
curs when older adults remember more positive infor-
mation than negative or neutral information, the more
common pattern of results is exactly what we see in
the present study: Older adults show a mnemonic bene-
fit for positive information, whereas young adults do
not (e.g., Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003, Experi-
ment 2; Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, et al., 2007c; Kensinger,
O’Brien, et al., 2007; Kensinger et al., 2007a, 2007b).
This ‘‘positivity shift’’ was also evidenced by the fact that,
as compared to young adults, older adults showed poorer
general recognition for the neutral and negative items,
whereas the two age groups had similar general recogni-
tion scores for the positive items (see Table 2).
To examine whether these age-related changes arose
due to changes in ‘‘specific recognition’’ or in ‘‘nonspe-
cific recognition,’’ we conducted separate ANOVAs on
each of these recognition scores. An ANOVA conducted
on the specific recognition scores revealed a main effect
of age (older adults had poorer specific recognition
overall than young adults; p < .01) and a main effect
of valence (specific recognition was higher for negative
items than for positive or neutral items; p < .01), but no
interaction between age and valence (F <1 ) .B o t h
young and older adults showed enhanced specific rec-
ognition for negative items as compared to positive or
neutral ones (see Table 2). Thus, negative, but not pos-
itive, content enhanced the visual specificity of memory
in both age groups. By contrast, an ANOVA conducted
on the nonspecific recognition scores revealed a signif-
icant interaction between age and valence ( p < .01);
thus, the older adults’ ‘‘positivity shift’’ appears to stem
not from effects of positive emotion on memory for
visual specifics, but rather from effects on memory for
the general theme of previously presented objects.
Neuroimaging Results
All neuroimaging analyses report subsequent-memory
effects (Paller & Wagner, 2002). Analyses focus primarily
on subsequent ‘‘general recognition’’ memory, which
most closely parallels standard assessments of recogni-
tion memory (i.e., most recognition memory decisions
can be supported either by memory for specific details
or by memory for the general theme of the studied
Kensinger and Schacter 1165item). Thus, responses to studied items later tested as a
same exemplar were sorted based upon whether partic-
ipants later remembered at least the general theme of
the item (‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ response to the same
item) or later forgot the item (‘‘new’’ response to the
same item). We did extract signal change values sepa-
rately for items associated with ‘‘specific recognition’’
and for items associated with ‘‘nonspecific recognition’’
to be able to examine whether regions corresponded
more strongly with one type of memory than the other;
figures depicting signal change values are therefore
broken down by specific versus nonspecific recognition.
Regions Related to Subsequent General Recognition,
Regardless of Emotional Content
We first examined the effect of age on the neural
processes predictive of subsequent general recognition
memory for all items, regardless of their emotional
content. We used conjunction analyses to reveal regions
that were related to subsequent-memory performance
for both young and older adults, and group comparison
analyses to reveal regions that were disproportionately
related to subsequent-memory performance for one age
group compared to the other. These analyses revealed
Table 2. Proportion of ‘‘Same,’’ ‘‘Similar,’’ and ‘‘New’’ Responses [Mean (SE)] as a Function of Item Type (Same, Similar,o r
New), Emotion Type (Positive, Negative, Neutral), and Age (Young, Older Adults)
Same Exemplar Similar Exemplar New Exemplar
Young Adults
Positive Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.52 (0.02) 0.22 (0.04) 0.09 (0.01)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.24 (0.03) 0.43 (0.03) 0.24 (0.03)
‘‘New’’ response 0.24 (0.02) 0.35 (0.03) 0.66 (0.04)
Negative Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.57 (0.02) 0.23 (0.03) 0.09 (0.02)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.23 (0.03) 0.42 (0.04) 0.26 (0.03)
‘‘New’’ response 0.20 (0.02) 0.35 (0.03) 0.64 (0.03)
Neutral Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.50 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03) 0.09 (0.01)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.25 (0.02) 0.41 (0.02) 0.24 (0.03)
‘‘New’’ response 0.25 (0.02) 0.39 (0.04) 0.66 (0.03)
Older Adults
Positive Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.45 (0.02) 0.21 (0.04) 0.06 (0.01)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.29 (0.03) 0.34 (0.05) 0.17 (0.03)
‘‘New’’ response 0.25 (0.02) 0.45 (0.04) 0.77 (0.04)
Negative Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.50 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03) 0.06 (0.01)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.26 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02)
‘‘New’’ response 0.25 (0.02) 0.47 (0.04) 0.74 (0.03)
Neutral Objects
‘‘Same’’ response 0.44 (0.02) 0.27 (0.05) 0.05 (0.01)
‘‘Similar’’ response 0.26 (0.03) 0.30 (0.03) 0.17 (0.02)
‘‘New’’ response 0.31 (0.02) 0.43 (0.02) 0.78 (0.03)
Specific recognition reflects the proportion of ‘‘same’’ responses to same items, nonspecific recognition reflects the proportion of ‘‘similar’’ re-
sponses to same items, and general recognition reflects the sum of ‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ responses to same items.
1166 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 7that, for both young and older adults, a network of
regions in the temporal, parietal, and occipital cortices
corresponded with successful encoding (i.e., activity was
greater during the encoding of items given a ‘‘same’’ or
‘‘similar’’ response as compared to a ‘‘new’’ response;
see upper panel of Table 3). However, there also were
important age differences in the neural processes en-
gaged. In particular, young adults showed more medial
temporal lobe engagement than older adults (see mid-
dle panel of Table 3) and older adults showed more
prefrontal engagement than young adults (see lower
panel of Table 3). These results are consistent with
other evidence suggesting that, with aging, individuals
may recruit fewer medial temporal lobe mnemonic pro-
cesses and more prefrontal mnemonic processes (e.g.,
Gutchess et al., 2005).
Memory for Negative and Positive Compared to
Neutral Information
Although these results replicated the major findings
from prior studies examining the effects of aging on ep-
isodic encoding, the primary goal of the present study
was to examine the neural processes that relate to young
and older adults’ memories for positive and negative
information. We used conjunction analyses to reveal the
neural processes that corresponded with subsequent
general recognition memory for positive information
and also with negative information, but not with neutral
information. Conjunction analyses revealed that activity
in the amygdala (Talairach coordinates: 15, 5, 18) and
in the orbito-frontal cortex (BA 11/47, Talairach coordi-
nates: 30, 14, 14), as well as in the lateral parietal lobe
(BA 40, Talairach coordinates: 46, 38, 36), showed this
correspondence for both young and older adults (Fig-
ure 2). No regions showed this correspondence dispro-
portionately for one age group as compared to the other.
Regions Related to Subsequent General Recognition of
Negative but not Positive or Neutral Information
To examine the neural processes that were related more
strongly to the successful encoding of negative informa-
tion as compared to positive or neutral information, we
conducted interaction analyses to reveal the regions that
were disproportionately related to subsequent general
Table 3. Regions that Corresponded with Subsequent General Recognition for All Items (Positive, Negative, or Neutral)
Lobe Region Hemisphere Brodmann’s Area Talairach Coordinates
Young and Older Adults
Frontal Middle frontal gyrus R 9/10 30, 54, 10
Temporal Parahippocampal gyrus L 36 38, 32, 14
Occipital Fusiform gyrus L 18/19 34, 80, 2
Cuneus L 30 20, 91, 10
R 14, 67, 13
Young but not Older Adults
Temporal Hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus Bilateral – 28, 18, 13
26, 14, 12
Older but not Young Adults
Frontal Medial frontal gyrus L 10 16, 64, 4
L9 6, 52, 20
L1 0 2, 65, 17
R 10 8, 56, 3
Middle frontal gyrus L 10 38, 54, 1
Inferior frontal gyrus R 45 52, 25, 1
Temporal Middle temporal gyrus R 22 58, 33, 5
Other Insula R 13 44, 17, 4
Anterior cingulate gyrus Bilateral 32 0, 43, 7
All regions consist of at least 5 voxels.
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quent general recognition of positive or neutral items
(i.e., [‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ to negative item > ‘‘new’’
response to negative item] > [‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ to
positive or neutral item > ‘‘new’’ response to positive or
neutral item]). A conjunction analysis was conducted to
examine the regions that showed this correspondence
for both young and older adults, and group comparison
analyses were conducted to examine the regions that
showed this correspondence more strongly for one age
group than for the other.
The conjunction analysis revealed that, for both young
and older adults, activity in the right fusiform gyrus
(Talairach coordinates: 20, 64, 3, BA 19/37; Figure 3)
showed a greater correspondence to memory for nega-
tive items than for positive or neutral items. Importantly,
the group comparison analyses revealed no regions that
were disproportionately recruited by young adults or
by older adults for the successful encoding of negative
items. Thus, the main distinction between regions pre-
dictive of later memory for negative compared to posi-
tive and neutral items appears to be visual engagement,
and this distinction is constant across age groups. In-
deed, when signal change was analyzed as a function of
the type of recognition response given to a same item,
the pattern of activity in the right fusiform gyrus was
found to be much greater for items later given a ‘‘same’’
response (i.e., for items later remembered with visual
detail) than for items later given a ‘‘similar’’ response
(see lower panels of Figure 3). This link between right
fusiform activity and the encoding of specific visual
detail was equally strong for the young and older adults;
there was no Memory  Age interaction, nor a three-way
Memory  Age  Emotion interaction.
Regions Related to Subsequent General Recognition of
Positive but not Negative or Neutral Information
To examine the neural processes related to successful
encoding of positive as compared to negative or neutral
Figure 2. Regions recruited by both young and older adults during
the successful encoding of positive and negative (but not neutral)
items. These regions included the amygdala (shown on the
coronal slice, y = 6) as well as regions of the orbito-frontal cortex
and lateral parietal cortex. Graphs depict signal change in the
amygdala, demonstrating that young and older adults both showed
a correspondence between amygdala activity and subsequent
memory for positive and negative items, but no correspondence
between amygdala activity and later memory for neutral items.
Figure 3. Regions that
showed a stronger
correspondence to subsequent
general recognition for the
negative items than for the
neutral or positive items. Only
a region of the right fusiform
gyrus showed a stronger
correspondence to general
recognition (i.e., a greater
discrepancy between activity
during the encoding of
items that would later be
recognized [recog] vs.
forgotten [forgot]) for the
negative items (red bars) than
for the positive (blue bars)
or neutral items (yellow bars).
This pattern was evident for
both the young adults (left
panel) and older adults (right
panel). When signal change
for the recognized items was
broken down by response type to the same items (lower panels), the results revealed that the region’s activity was greatest for items later
recognized with specific visual detail (i.e., was greater for items correctly given a ‘‘same’’ response than for items incorrectly given a ‘‘similar’’
response).
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those described in the previous Results section. We con-
ducted interaction analyses to reveal the regions that
were disproportionately engaged during the successful
encoding of positive items compared to during the suc-
cessful encoding of negative or neutral items (i.e.,
[‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ to positive item > ‘‘new’’ response
to positive item] > [‘‘same’’ or ‘‘similar’’ to negative or
neutral item > ‘‘new’’ response to negative or neutral
item]). We then conducted a conjunction analysis to
examine the regions that showed this correspondence
for both young and older adults, and we performed
group comparison analyses to examine the regions that
showed this correspondence more strongly for one age
group than for the other.
The conjunction analysis revealed a large fronto-
temporal network of regions that were more strongly
associated with memory for positive items than with
memory for negative or neutral items in both young and
older adults (see Table 4). These regions within the left
prefrontal cortex and the left temporal lobe are consis-
tent with those often involved in conceptual processing
(e.g., Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Poldrack et al., 1999),
and their engagement may reflect the schematic or heu-
ristic processing of positive items. Consistent with this
interpretation, these regions’ activity was equally strong
for all items that were later recognized, regardless of
whether the items were later remembered with visual
detail (i.e., were later given a correct ‘‘same’’ response)
or with only nonspecific information (i.e., were given an
incorrect ‘‘similar’’ response; see Figure 4). This pattern
of results suggests that these regions’ engagement corre-
sponded with encoding of information about the general
theme of an item (e.g., its verbal label or semantic at-
tributes) but not its visually specific details.
Group comparison analyses revealed that there were
no regions disproportionately employed by the young
compared to the older adults, consistent with the be-
havioral finding that young adults did not show a
mnemonic enhancement for positive items as compared
to neutral ones. In contrast, older adults showed a stron-
ger correspondence between medial prefrontal and cin-
gulate gyrus activity and memory for positive items than
did young adults (see Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study reveal age-related pre-
servation in the neural processes that are recruited dur-
ing the successful encoding of emotional items. Both
young and older adults recruited the amygdala and the
orbito-frontal cortex during the encoding of emotional
items but not during the encoding of neutral items.
These limbic regions frequently have been implicated in
Table 4. Regions that were Related to Subsequent General Recognition of Positive Items, but not of Negative or Neutral Ones
Lobe Region Hemisphere Brodmann’s Area Talairach Coordinates
Young and Older Adults
Frontal Superior frontal gyrus R 10 20, 66, 7
Middle frontal gyrus L 10 28, 59, 21
Inferior frontal gyrus L 45/47 52, 30, 8
Parietal Precuneus/posterior cingulate gyrus R 31 16, 47, 32
Temporal Middle temporal gyrus L 21 63, 54, 6
Superior temporal gyrus L 22 57, 36, 11
Limbic Parahippocampal gyrus L 28/35 21, 18, 11
Subcortical Caudate R – 14, 32, 25
Young but not Older Adults
No regions revealed
Older but not Young Adults
Frontal Medial frontal gyrus Bilateral 10 0, 33 10
Limbic Anterior cingulate gyrus L 24 8, 26, 10
R 33 10, 11, 25
Posterior cingulate gyrus L 23 8, 45, 26
All regions consist of at least 5 voxels.
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tion (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), and the present results
suggest that these regions retain their role in emotional
memory across the adult lifespan.
These results are interesting in light of debates re-
garding the stability of the emotional processing net-
work with aging. Although some studies have suggested
age-related preservation of amygdala recruitment during
emotional processing (Wright, Wedig, Williams, Rauch,
& Albert, 2006), other studies have suggested that aging
may be associated with reductions in amygdala recruit-
ment—at least during the processing of negative stimuli
(e.g., fearful and angry facial expressions or negative
colored photographs; Tessitore et al., 2005; Mather
et al., 2004; Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003). Older adults
also sometimes show overrecruitment of prefrontal
regions during the processing of negatively emotional
information, leading some to hypothesize that older
adults may engage in active regulation of their negative
emotion states (e.g., Williams et al., 2006; Tessitore et al.,
2005). The present study cannot settle this debate.
However, the current findings suggest that, if there are
age-related changes in amygdala recruitment during
emotional processing, these changes are not sufficient
to eliminate the amygdala’s role in emotional memory.
There may be age-related changes in emotion regulation
or in the prioritization of emotion-related goals (e.g.,
Carstensen et al., 1999; Gross et al., 1997; Labouvie-Vief,
1982), but these changes do not appear to fundamen-
tally alter the core of the emotional memory network.
Young and older adults also showed similarities in the
valence-specific processes that supported the successful
encoding of negative versus positive information. In par-
ticular, both age groups recruited the right fusiform
gyrus disproportionately during the encoding of nega-
tive items but showed additional recruitment of prefron-
tal and lateral temporal regions during the encoding of
positive items. These valence-specific processes dovetail
nicely with the behavioral evidence that young and older
adults remember visual details more for negative than
for positive items, and remember positive information in
a more schematic or general fashion (Kensinger et al.,
2007a, 2007b; Storbeck & Clore, 2005; Gasper & Clore,
2002; Bless et al., 1996). The right fusiform gyrus often
has been implicated in the processing of specific visual
details. Activation of this region during encoding cor-
responds with memory for visual details (Kensinger,
G a r o f f - E a t o n ,e ta l . ,2 0 0 7 c ;G a r o f fe ta l . ,2 0 0 5 ) ,a n d
priming-related decrements in this region occur only
when the visual details of an object remain stable across
item repetitions (Koutstaal et al., 2001). Thus, it makes
sense that additional recruitment of this region during
the encoding of negative items would correspond with
better memory for those negative items’ visual features.





forgotten) for the positive
items than for the neutral or
negative items. Red regions
showed this correspondence
for both young and older
adults. Green regions showed
this correspondence for the
older adults but not for the
young adults. No regions
showed this correspondence
for the young adults but not
the older adults, consistent
with the behavioral finding that
only older adults showed
mnemonic enhancement for
the positive items. Graphs
depict percentage signal
change from the region of the
left prefrontal cortex circled
in yellow, representative of the
types of activity patterns noted
throughout the prefrontal and
temporal lobe regions revealed
by this analysis. This region showed a stronger correspondence to general recognition (i.e., a greater discrepancy between activity during the
encoding of items that would later be recognized [recog] vs. forgotten [forgot]) for the positive items (blue bars) than for the negative (red bars) or
neutral items (yellow bars). This pattern was evident for both the young adults (left panel) and older adults (right panel). When signal change for
the recognized items was broken down by response type to the same items (lower panels), the results revealed that the region’s activity was
equivalent regardless of whether items were later recognized with specific visual detail (i.e., were correctly given a ‘‘same’’ response) or with only
nonspecific information (i.e., were incorrectly given a ‘‘similar’’ response).
1170 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 20, Number 7Indeed, in the present study, the right fusiform activity
was greater during the encoding of items that later would
be remembered with visual detail (i.e., for same items
correctly given a ‘‘same’’ response) than for items later
remembered without visual detail (i.e., for same items
incorrectly given a ‘‘similar’’ response). By contrast, the
prefrontal and temporal regions that showed a dispropor-
tionate correspondence to memory for the positive items
are regions associated with conceptual processing. For
example, the left prefrontal cortex, and particularly the
left anterior prefrontal region revealed here (BA 45/47),
has been implicated in the retrieval of conceptual details
(Dobbins & Wagner, 2005) and in conceptual and se-
mantic priming (e.g., Poldrack et al., 1999). Thus, it makes
sense that recruitment of these regions may relate to the
processing of general, conceptual information about pos-
itive objects. The present results support this conclusion,
with encoding-related activity in these regions being
equally high for all items recognized with at least gen-
eral information (i.e., with equivalent levels of activity for
items later given a correct ‘‘same’’ response or an incor-
rect ‘‘similar’’ response).
These results, therefore, suggest that at least part of
the distinct effects of valence arise due to the influences
of encoding processes. It may be that participants’ at-
tention is directed toward different features of negative
versus positive items (e.g., to perceptual rather than
conceptual attributes) and that these differences influ-
ence the types of information later remembered about
the items. The results further emphasize that the influ-
ence of valence upon encoding processes remains con-
sistent across the adult lifespan. Despite evidence that
older adults focus more on positive information than
young adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2005), aging does
not appear to disrupt the types of valence-specific pro-
cesses recruited during information processing.
Although there were these extensive commonalities
among the processes engaged during young and older
adults’ successful encoding of emotional information,
there also was age-associated divergence during the
encoding of the positive items. In particular, older adults
recruited the medial prefrontal cortex and the cingulate
gyrus more than young adults during the successful
encoding of positive information. The fact that older
adults showed this additional correspondence between
encoding-related activity and subsequent memory sug-
gests that the ‘‘positivity shift’’ occurs, at least in part,
due to age-related differences in how information is pro-
cessed upon initial encounter.
The fact that it was these particular regions that
showed the age-related divergence is particularly intrigu-
ing given these regions’ purported roles in self-referential
processing
2 (D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Macrae, Moran,
Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Kelley et al., 2002;
Craik et al., 1999; see meta-analysis by Northoff et al.,
2006), a type of processing that enhances the effectiveness
of encoding (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; see Symons
& Johnson, 1997 for a review). This self-referential mne-
monic boost extends to older adults (Gutchess, Kensinger,
Yoon, & Schacter, 2007; Mueller, Wonderlich, & Dugan,
1986), and so it makes good sense that if older adults
process positive information in a particularly self-relevant
manner, they might show a ‘‘positivity shift’’ in memory. It
is possible that because of older adults’ increased empha-
sis on emotion regulation (e.g., Carstensen et al., 1999;
Gross et al., 1997), they may be prone to think about how
positive things relate to their own life and to their own
sense of self. It will be important for further research to
examine the validity of this hypothesis by directly assessing
the relation between self-referential processing and sub-
sequent memory in young and older adults.
Conclusions
The present results emphasize that there are common
regions that young and older adults recruit in order
to remember emotional information. Young and older
adults recruit the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex
during the encoding of positive and negative informa-
tion; they recruit the right fusiform gyrus preferentially
during the encoding of negative information, and the
left prefrontal and temporal regions disproportionately
during the encoding of positive information. This gen-
eral consistency in emotional memory processes aligns
well with the overall preservation of the emotional mem-
ory enhancement effect with aging. However, age effects
do emerge during the encoding of positive information.
Older adults show a stronger correspondence than young
adults between memory for positive information and
activity in the medial prefrontal cortex, and in regions
along the cingulate gyrus. Because these regions have
been implicated in self-referential processing (Northoff
et al., 2006; Macrae et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2002), this
finding suggests that the mnemonic enhancement that
older adults (but not young adults) display for positive
information may result from older adults’ tendency to
process positive information in reference to themselves.
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Notes
1. Responses to items tested as similar exemplars are difficult
to interpret. ‘‘Similar’’ responses to similar exemplars could
reflect memory for visual detail (a participant could remember
Kensinger and Schacter 1171the details of the studied object and know that the tested
exemplar did not match); however, a ‘‘similar’’ response also
could reflect memory for only the general item type (a par-
ticipant could remember that a particular type of object had
been studied but have no memory for its visual details and
therefore call it ‘‘similar’’). A ‘‘new’’ response is also ambiguous:
It could signify that the studied item was forgotten, but it also
could be given if the participant remembered the studied item
but did not apply the same verbal label to the tested exemplar.
2. The regions disproportionately active during older adults’
encoding of positive items also tend to be the regions that are
active in the ‘‘default’’ state, when participants do not need to
be engaged in task-directed thought (e.g., Fox et al., 2005;
Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Shulman et al.,
1997). It has been proposed that there may be a link between
these regions’ roles in self-referential processing and their
activity during these baseline (i.e., task-void) periods: When
people are not given a specific task to perform, they often
engage in self-referential thinking, including recollection of past
experiences and simulations of future experiences (Schacter,
Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Older adults often show difficulty
disengaging these regions during task performance, perhaps
suggesting an increased tendency for older adults to continue
self-referential processing even when it is not directly pertinent
to task performance (e.g., Persson, Lustig, Nelson, & Reuter-
Lorenz, 2007; Grady, Springer, Hongwanishkul, McIntosh, &
Winocur, 2006; Lustig et al., 2003). It will be interesting for
future research to examine whether this difficulty in disengage-
ment may be associated with the increased importance that
older adults place on emotion regulation goals (e.g., are the
older adults who show the most difficulty disengaging self-
referential processes also those same individuals who put the
greatest emphasis on emotional well-being).
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